Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies by Cardilli, Maria Camilla
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 27, Issue 2 2003 Article 10
Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies
Maria Camilla Cardilli∗
∗
Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies
Maria Camilla Cardilli
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to: (i) outline the key provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, highlighting
the aspects of the Act which are most likely to impact European companies as well as their officers
and directors; (ii) point out the provisions of the Act which conflict with EU national laws; and
(iii) illustrate the key points of the proposed European reform of corporate governance, as formu-
lated on November 4, 2002 by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts appointed by the
European Commission.
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SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
"Today I sign into law the most far-reaching reform of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt," declared President George W. Bush on July 30,
2002.' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or the
"Act"), approved in the House of Representatives by 422 votes to
3 and in the Senate by 99 to 0, attempts to restore investor confi-
dence in U.S. capital markets after the corporate scandals of
2001.2 Specifically, the Act is designed "to protect investors by
1. Julia Finch, U.S. Clean-Up Angers Hewitt, GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4517263,00.html. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
2. The series of corruption scandals in the United States began in October 2001,
with the revelation that Enron, America's biggest energy corporation, had fraudulently
acted with its auditor Arthur Andersen to camouflage its losses. Shortly after,
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improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
made pursuant to the securities laws and for other purposes."'
The purpose of this study is to: (i) outline the key provi-
sions of Sarbanes-Oxley, highlighting the aspects of the Act
which are most likely to impact European companies as well as
their officers and directors; (ii) point out the provisions of the
Act which conflict with EU national laws; and (iii) illustrate the
key points of the proposed European reform of corporate gov-
ernance, as formulated on November 4, 2002 by the High Level
Group of Company Law Experts appointed by the European
Commission.
I. A LAW DESIGNED TO PROTECT INVESTORS
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has al-
ways been recognized as the "statutory guardian" of the public's
interest with regard to federal securities law.4 Indeed, many of
Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions involve remedies that trace their
roots to the SEC's enforcement program of the 1970s, a period
often referred to as the "golden age of SEC enforcement."5 Stan-
ley Sporkin, director of the SEC's Enforcement Division at the
time, delivered a speech in 1976 entitled Restoring Integrity to
American Business.6 In it he suggested that companies appoint a
business practice officer to be responsible for implementing
codes of ethical conduct. 7
In fact, very few statutory remedies were available to the SEC
WorldCom, the telecommunications giant, was in the news for huge unaccountable
"holes" in its financial statements, which led to its filing for bankruptcy in July 2002. It
was described by the New York Times as "the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of
the United States." Simon Romero & Riva Atlas, Bankruptcy at WorldCom is the Largest in
U.S. Histoy, N.Y. TIMESJuly 22, 2002, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_- 02/07.
23B.world.largest.htm. More corporate scandals, such as those that caused the fall of
Tyco first and of Xerox later, were yet to come.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 745.
4. Theodore A. Levine & Daniel M. Hawke, Sarbanes-Oxley: Back to the Future, CHIEF
LEGAL EXECUTIVE, Winter 2003, at 14, available at http://sechistorical.org/museum/
Museum-Papers [hereinafter Levine & Hawke].
5. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). See Robert Reno, Financial Watchdogs are
Chihuahuas, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 2003, available at http://www.hollandsentinel.com/sto-
ies/102302/opi_102302020.shtml.
6. See Levine & Hawke, supra note 4, at 17.
7. SeeJOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF SECUR-
ITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 360-63, 462-66
(1982). See also Levine & Hawke, supra note 4, at 17.
2004]
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in the early 1970s. Its authority to seek injunctive relief' had
proved insufficient to remedy the harm from violators or to de-
ter them from committing violations in the future.9 The SEC
did not have the authority to impose fines or penalties on issuers
or their management. Moreover, it could not enforce the dis-
gorgement of management's ill-gotten profits, thus having to
rely instead on the equitable discretion of the courts.10 Gener-
ally, courts granted equitable relief to the extent necessary to
achieve the purposes of the securities laws." l
The SEC also developed the so-called "access theory" of se-
curities law enforcement.12 Grounded on the belief that lawyers,
accountants, and securities industry professionals held the keys
to their clients' compliance with the law, the access theory put
pressure on these professionals to monitor their clients' corpo-
rate transactions. Those who failed to do so faced SEC enforce-
ment actions for their own participation, even acquiescence, in
their clients' violations.13
In a 1976 speech to the Corporate Counsel Institute,14 Stan-
ley Sporkin explained the rationale underlying the access theory:
We all recognize that a major securities fraud cannot be per-
petrated by a corporation, its officers and directors without
access to our financial markets. Such access can only be pro-
vided through the activities of broker-dealers, banks, insur-
ance companies et al. In addition, systematized frauds fre-
quently depend on the cooperation - intentional or other-
wise - of professionals such as lawyers and public
accountants. Many of the most egregious frauds of the past
few years . . . have involved the full panoply of professional
participation.'"
Over the years, the SEC's statutory remedial powers were broad-
8. See Levine & Hawke, supra note 4, at 14.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See joy A. SIGLER &JOSEPH E. MuRPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION 31, 48, 72, 130 (1988).
13. See Levine & Hawke, supra note 4, at 18.
14. Stanley Sporkin, SEC Enforcement Practices Against Corporations, Address
Before the Corporate Counsel Institute in Chicago (Oct. 7, 1976).
15. Daniel M. Hawke, Roundtable on Enforcement: A Brief Histoy of the SEC's Enforce-
ment Program 1934-1981, SEC Historical Society, at 27 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at
http://sechistorical.org/museum/museum OralHistories.php.
[Vol. 27:785
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ened after a series of Wall Street scandals, which highlighted the
evident weaknesses of these enforcement powers. 6
The mid-1980s witnessed a shift in the SEC's enforcement
program. Controversies surfaced regarding the SEC's efforts to
police the conduct of accountants, lawyers, and other profession-
als.' 7 Enforcement programs encountered increasing resistance,
however, as the courts progressively adopted narrower interpre-
tations of the securities laws to prevent SEC attempts to broaden
the scope of its authority.18
With the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the circle
has closed. The SEC today exercises broad powers, some of
which are based on long-established principles. The code of eth-
ics that Stanley Sporkin called for in 1976 is now mandated by
statute,1 9 particularly Section 307 of the Act ("Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Attorneys") which is essentially a doctri-
nal extension of the access theory. The SEC's express authority
to obtain the forfeiture of executives' bonuses and profits vali-
dates the SEC's previous efforts to obtain disgorgement of ill-
earned profits. 20
Following Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC completed the most in-
tense rule-making year in its history. 21 Never had it been af-
forded such authority to punish or deter wrongdoing.2 2 Corpo-
rate governance rules and monitoring procedures have been
made significantly stricter. Accounting regulations seek to
achieve two primary goals:
(i) to prevent parasitic auditor/client relationships from tak-
ing root; and
(ii) to tighten up the standards used in financial reporting,
standards which had previously been flexible enough to
allow firms to get away with anything "from slightly exag-
gerated to fantastic projections" of companies' financial
16. See id. at 4.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
20. See discussion infra Part III.A.4.
21. Thomas G. Bost, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Summary, 7 NAT'L LEGAL
CENTER FOR THE PUB. INT., Apr. 2003, available at http://www.nlcpi.org/books/wel-
come.htm.
22. William R. Baker III & Christopher E. Campbell, Sarbanes-Oxley Enhancements to
the SEC's Enforcement Authority, 7 WALL STREET LAWYER, No. 4, Sept. 2003, available at
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/wsl/wsl0903.html.
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situations.
23
Companies' board members have been directed to become
more inquisitive so that questions that might have seemed "hos-
tile" to management two years ago would now be considered a
natural extension of directors' functions.2 4
Sarbanes-Oxley is a complex piece of legislation that breaks
ground in many areas of corporate governance and affects cor-
porate America in numerous and substantial ways. It amends
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the In-
vestments Advisers Act of 1940, as well as a variety of statutes
regulating federal fraud, criminal law, and bankruptcy.25 It calls
for U.S. government studies and reports on numerous business
and accounting issues relating to public companies.2 6 Moreover,
the Act impacts public companies' officers, directors, employees,
advisors (including attorneys appearing and practicing before
the SEC), securities analysts, brokers and dealers, accountants,
accounting firms, and accounting practices and principles. Most
importantly for the purposes of this study, Sarbanes-Oxley's pro-
visions are far-reaching and make virtually no distinction be-
tween U.S. and foreign companies with securities registered or
listed in the United States.
27
23. EU-US Project Group, Special Supplement of Corporate Governance, Institute of Eu-
rope Affairs, available at http://iiea.com/projs.html (n.d.).
24. SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content
and Status of Implementation, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 25, 2003, available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/spch032503psa.htm.
25. Kaye Scholer LLP, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 1, available at http://li-
brary.lp.findlaw.com/articles/00969/008687.pdf (Aug. 2002).
26. See id. Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title VII, the U.S. government was
required to submit detailed reports on (i) the factors leading to, the impact on, and the
problems created by the consolidation of public accounting firms, (ii) the role and
function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the securities markets, (iii) the
violations and violators of the federal securities laws from January 1, 1998 to December
31, 2001, (iv) the SEC enforcement actions during the five years subsequent to the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, (v) whether investment banks and financial advisers as-
sisted public companies in manipulating their earnings and obfuscating their true fi-
nancial condition.
27. For further discussion of the direct and indirect effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on European companies, see Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of
Europe ("UNICE"), Sarbanes-Oxley Act: UNICE Comments, Oct. 10, 2002 (on file with
author) [hereinafter UN/CE Comments].
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II. EUROPEAN CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY UNICE
European businesses, while in favor of improved corporate
governance standards, are not completely supportive of some of
the changes underway in the United States. Concern was voiced
by the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Eu-
rope ("UNICE"), one of the most authoritative representatives
of business in Europe .2  The corporate governance of compa-
nies, explains UNICE, is the product of a complex system having
its roots in the country in which they are incorporated; a system
that is the result of laws, regulations, self-regulation, accepted
practices, and, more generally, of the legal and economic cul-
ture prevailing in each country. 29 The risk inherent in the appli-
cation of Sarbanes-Oxley to non-U.S. issuers, particularly in cor-
porate governance, is that some of the Act's individual provi-
sions will conflict with those in force in the companies' country
of incorporation.
UNICE argues that European companies with their main
listings on European exchanges already meet tough audit stan-
dards and that the extra burdens imposed on them "go beyond
what is needed to achieve the results that are sought."3 0 Internal
Market Commissioner Fritz Bolkestein agrees, arguing that "the
implementation of some of the provisions of the Act might have
undesirable extraterritorial consequences creating unnecessary
difficulties for European companies. The European Commis-
sion's concern is that if its issuers and auditing firms are already
subject to robust measures in their home markets, double regu-
lation will impose unnecessary burdens and costs.
3 1
28. See Friends of the Earth International, The Citizens' Guide to Trade, Environment
and Sustainability, Trade Environment & Sustainability Programme, available at http://
www.foei.org/trade/activistguide (Jan. 24, 2001). See also Batuk Gathani, E. U. fine-tunes
accession formalities, THE HINDU, Oct. 24, 2002, available at http://www.hinduonnet.
com/2002/ 10/24/stories/2002102401141500.htm.
29. See UNICE Comments, supra note 27.
30. Eamon Quinn, Accountants Step up Bill Against U.S. Law, THE PosT.IE, Sept. 15,
2002, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2002/09/15/story327663.as. See
Letter from Phillipe de Buck, Secretary of UNICE, to Frits Bolkestein, Internal Market
Commissioner(n.d.) (on file with author). See also Letter from Frits Bolkestein, Inter-
nal Market Commissioner, to Harvey Pitt, Chairman of the SEC from 2001-2003 (Aug.
29, 2002) (on file with author); EU-US Project Group, supra note 23, at 4.
31. Letter from Alexander Schaub, Director General of the European Commis-
sion, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/aschaubl.htm. [hereinafter Letter from Schaub to
Katz, 2/18/03]. The text reads as follows:
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Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley marks a radical change in the atti-
tude of the United States towards foreign issuers. In the past,
foreign companies benefited from a general exemption from
the application of American corporate governance rules. 32 Non-
U.S. companies listed in the United States were simply required
to disclose their corporate governance arrangements; a solution
that created no interference with the internal organization of
most foreign issuers. Underlying this approach was the recogni-
tion that other national legal systems had the capacity to assure
equivalent levels of investor protection. This encouraged the
listing of foreign companies on U.S. markets, without triggering
the complications that adapting to a system different from their
own would have caused.34 The shift in the United States' ap-
proach toward imposing predetermined corporate governance
requirements on foreign issuers and enhancing the responsibili-
ties of issuers and their top management is rendered even more
controversial by the difficulty foreign companies have in exiting
U.S. markets. De-listed but registered issuers are nonetheless
subject to the reporting requirements set forth in the securities
laws. 35 This has caused several non-U.S. companies to approach
We request full recognition of equivalence of EU corporate governance sys-
tem .... [T]he SEC should be aware that EU companies and auditors are
already subject to longstanding, well-developed member state corporate gov-
ernance requirements. These are tailored to their specific legal environments
and are in their different ways as effective and efficient at providing investor
protection as U.S. rules. Additional requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
applied to EU companies and auditors would place on them an unnecessary
additional layer of requirements - taken from a completely different (U.S.)
corporate governance environment. We fail to see why EU companies and au-
ditors should be overburdened with such duplicative requirements compared
to their U.S. counterparts.... Bearing this in mind, the SEC should recognize
the equivalence of EU corporate governance systems and thus fully exempt
not only EU lawyers but also EU companies and auditors from the provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley, also with regard to audit committee requirements.
Id.
32. See id.
33. Bowne & Co., Inc., Sarbanes-Oxley Seems Hostile to Foreign Listings, Bowne Securi-
ties Connect Newsletter, available at http://www.bowne.com/newsletters/newsletter.asp
?storylD=578 (Jan. 2003).
34. See id. See alsoJennifer Morris, Foreigners Forced to Play By US Rules, EUROMONEY,
Oct. 2002, at 42.
35. Pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an issuer
with more than 300 shareholders in the United States - and most listed companies fall
under this category - remains subject to the rules issued by the SEC and cannot avoid
registration even when it decides to abandon the U.S. markets through a de-listing pro-
cedure. All it can do to avoid these reporting obligations is buy back all of the shares in
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the SEC to obtain exemptions from the Act.36 A handful of Ger-
many's biggest firms, including DaimlerChrysler, Allianz AG,
and Deutsche Telekom, have had their petitions rejected when
trying to persuade the SEC that they should be exempt from the
new rules.
III. REQUIREMENTS OF SARBANES-OXLEY
The Act covers a very broad variety of issues. However, not
all of its provisions became effective on the day of its enactment.
A number of provisions only came into effect after the SEC
promulgated the timetables set forth in the Act. The following
outlines the most significant new requirements set forth in
Sarbanes-Oxley and their relative impact on various European
regulatory regimes.
A. New Corporate Governance Rules for Directors and
Executive Officers
1. CEO/CFO Certification of Reports3 8
The Act requires that CEOs and CFOs personally certify the
company's annual and quarterly reports under separate civil and
criminal provisions.3 9 Both provisions require the CEO and
CFO to certify, individually, that they have reviewed all reports
filed with the SEC and that, based on their knowledge, the re-
ports do not contain any material misstatement or omission of
any kind. In particular, the CEO and CFO must certify that (i)
the financial statements and other financial information in-
cluded in the reports are true and correct and fairly present -
in all material aspects - the financial conditions and results of
operations of the issuer, and that (ii) the company has imple-
mented adequate and effective disclosure controls and proce-
dures to assure transparency. Officers who knowingly provide
false certifications are punished with fines and severe criminal
excess of the 300-shareholder threshold. This buy-back can be complex and extremely
costly if, as is generally the case, the company's shareholders are not willing to sell.
36. See Peter Gumbel, Tough Act To Follow: New U.S. Legislation to Combat Corporate
Fraud Provokes a Backlash Among European Executives, 160 TiME EUROPE, Sept. 23, 2002,
available at http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901020923-
351174,00.html.
37. Id.
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302, 906.
39. Id. §§ 302(a)1-3, 906(a).
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penalties.4' The only reports that, despite their filing with the
SEC, are exempted from the described certification require-
ments are employee benefit plans and 8-K reports.
41
Pursuant to Italian law, however, the annual accounts of a
company must be prepared by the entire Board of Directors on a
collegial basis.42 Consequently, responsibility for the accuracy
and truthfulness of the accounts in Italy is assigned collegially
rather than individually to the Board of Directors. By requiring
the CEO and CFO to certify the accounts individually, the Act
transforms what was a purely internal responsibility (i.e., towards
the company) into a responsibility towards all third parties. By
the same token, the principle of ne bis in idem would be violated
since the same offence by any corporate management would be
punishable under two regimes: the Italian and the American.
In addition, French and German law provides for the colle-
gial responsibility of CEOs and CFOs with respect to the truthful-
ness and accuracy of the company's financial statements.43 Simi-
larly, English corporate governance rules ignore the individual
certification requirement.44 English law recognizes that all di-
rectors are collegially responsible for the company's statutory ac-
counts and does not provide for individual certification.45
2. Prohibition on Loans and Credit to Directors
and Executives46
Under the new provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, issuers are
prohibited from directly or indirectly extending, maintaining or
arranging for the extension of personal loans to their directors
40. Id. § 802(a).
41. SeeJAMES D. Cox ET. AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERoMAS 675
(3d ed. 2001) (defining 8-ks as reports which must be filed quarterly by public compa-
nies to give notice of any corporate changes or material events which haven't previously
been disclosed in other forms). The decision to exempt 8-Ks and employee benefit
plan reports from the new certification requirements was announced by the SEC in
October 2003. Id.
42. See CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] arts. 2423, 2381 (It.).
43. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C.coM.] L225-251 (Fr,) (particularly Article L232-1
concerning the preparation of the corporate balance sheets by the board of directors).
See also German Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz] §93-I (recognizing the responsi-
bility of the whole Vorstand and not only of certain executives).
44. See Companies Act of 1985 §233.
45. See id. at 49.
46. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402 (a).
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and executive officers. 47 The few exemptions from this prohibi-
tion concern particular types of loans by limited types of issuers
such as banks and brokerage firms.4 8 Loans already in existence
as of July 30, 2002 are also exempt, provided that there be no
material modification of any term of the loan, and that it not be
renewed or extended.49
In this area, we encounter only minor aspects of incompati-
bility with European rules. Amongst these, Italian law, which
once prohibited directors, general managers, and members of
the board of auditors of a company from obtaining loans from
the company or its subsidiaries, has recently been amended, to
allow an Italian company to grant such loans.5 ° English and
French law, on the contrary, forbid loans to directors and of-
ficers with provisions similar to those of Sarbanes-Oxley.51
UNICE representatives of Germany have not yet taken an
official position with respect to the compatibility of German cor-
porate governance rules and Section 402 of the Act. However,
they have criticized the provision as being rather "unclear as to
the persons concerned.
5 2
3. Senior Management Code of Ethics53
With the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, management and
47. See id.
48. Due to the fact that U.S.-chartered banks are largely exempt from this prohi-
bition, the SEC is considering the possibility of extending this exemption to non-
U.S. financial institutions. See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and U.S. Regulatory Developments, Corporate Publications: Sarbanes-Oxley Material, 3
n.2, available at http://www.freshfields.com/practice/corporate/publications/sarbanes
oxley (Jan. 2004).
49. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a). Note that arrangements such as the cashless
exercise of share options and loans in advance of indemnification are not addressed in
Sarbanes-Oxley, nor have they yet been addressed by the SEC.
50. Article 2624 of the Italian Civil Code - which prohibited directors, general
managers, and members of the board of auditors of a company from obtaining loans
from the company itself or from any of its subsidiaries - has been abolished, thus
making it legitimate for a corporation to grant such loans. See Luca Enriques, The
Changing Role of Directors in Corporate Governance - Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment
from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911,
922-23.
51. See Companies Act of 1985 § 330; see also C.coM .L225-243.
52. UNICE, Compilation of Conflicts between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and EU National
Laws, Part VIII: Germany, Oct. 2002, at 49 (on file with author) [hereinafter Compila-
tion of Conflicts].
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction SEC Release No. 33-8177A, available at
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directors are encouraged to emphasize ethics and integrity in
business decisions.5 4 In the reports they file with the SEC, issu-
ers must disclose whether or not they have adopted a code of
ethics applicable to their principal financial officer and comp-
troller or principal accounting officer, that meets the require-
ments set forth in the Act. If an issuer has failed to adopt an
appropriate code of ethics, it must explain the reason for not
doing so.55
The ethics principles set forth in the code may be used to
ground operational requirements (things management must
do) as well as operational prohibitions (things management
must not do), and are generally illustrated with behavioral exam-
ples.56 Management is expected to understand and apply the
principles in situations the code does not specifically address.57
Failure to do so triggers a corrective and/or disciplinary action
which may range from reprimand to termination of employ-
ment. Furthermore, the company must report violations of the
code of ethics that involve unlawful conduct to the appropriate
authorities, thus possibly resulting in civil and criminal prosecu-
tion of the employee.
From the EU perspective, the code of ethics requirement
does not represent a major area of concern because it offers a
flexible approach to disclosure. This said, the added value of
such a disclosure to investors is not clear, as due diligence re-
quirements for directors should be sufficient to ensure ethical
behavior. Moreover, "grass is green" disclosures are very costly
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2003); Final Rule:
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 SEC
Release No. 33-8177, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last
modified Mar. 27, 2003).
54. See Edward L. Pittman & FrankJ. Navran, Corporate Code of Ethics and Sarbanes-
Oxley, 7 WALL STREET LAWYER, No. 2, July 2003, available at http://www.realcorporate-
lawyer.com/wsl/ws10703.html. The authors point out that the collapse of Enron was
preceded by the decision of the company's directors to specifically waive provisions of
the company's code of ethics. Id. This decision allowed Enron's chief financial officer
to benefit from transactions involving the company. Id.
55. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a). Companies must comply with the code of
ethics disclosure requirements in their annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after
July 15, 2003. A company may either file its code as an exhibit to the annual report,
post the code on the company's website, or agree to provide a copy of the code upon
request and without charge.
56. See Pittman & Navaran, supra note 54.
57. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §406(c) (discussing reasonableness standard).
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and diminish returns of scale for the companies who implement
them.58
Italy, England, and Germany have not taken an official posi-
tion regarding the adoption of a code of ethics. French law, on
the other hand, does not require the implementation of such a
code but encourages it on an exclusively voluntary basis. 9
4. Forfeiture by CEOs and CFOs of Certain Bonuses
and Profits6 °
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restate-
ment due to a material non-compliance or misconduct, the com-
pany's CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the issuer for:
(i) any bonuses or other incentive-based or equity-based com-
pensation they received from the issuer during the twelve-month
period following the first public issuance or filing with the SEC
of the financial document that did not comply with such finan-
cial reporting requirement;61 and (ii) any profits they may have
earned from the sale of securities of the issuer during that same
twelve-month period.62
This provision is significant because, read literally, the mis-
conduct giving rise to forfeiture is not necessarily limited to the
conduct of the CEO and CFO. In other words, the CEO and
CFO could be required to reimburse their own bonuses and
profits upon a finding that others in the company engaged in
the misconduct leading to the issuer's violation.63 This provision
has no equivalent under most European jurisdictions and is thus
likely to create problems of double regulation. Pursuant to the
Italian corporate governance rules, the only possibility of bring-
ing action to force directors to return part of their compensa-
tion exists when those directors have caused harm to the corpo-
58. See Letter from Alexander Schaub, Internal Market Director General of the
European Commission, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Nov. 29, 2002), availa-
ble at http://Nww.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/aschaubl.htm [hereinafter Letter
from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03].
59. See Compilation of Conflicts, supra note 52.
60. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304.
61. See id. § 304(a)(1).
62. See id. § 304(a)(2).
63. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a) (stating that forfeiture will occur "[i]f an is-
suer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material non-compli-
ance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement
under the securities laws").
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ration by failing to perform their duties.64 Under French law
too, there is no equivalent of Sarbanes-Oxley's Section 304. Al-
though France recognizes a possibility for criminal jurisdictions
to fine directors by an amount up to ten times the gains earned
by same directors as a result of their violations, such sanctions
could only be provided in the context of an action for dam-
ages.65
5. Prohibition of Improper Influence on Audits6 6
The Act provides that no action may be taken by any direc-
tor or officer of an issuer (or person acting under their direc-
tion) to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead
any independent auditor of the issuer's financial statements for
the purpose of rendering the financial statements materially mis-
leading.67 The SEC rules implementing this provision of law
supplement the pre-existing ones which addressed the falsifica-
tion of books, records, and accounts. They are particularly use-
ful in that, for the first time, they provide practical examples of
the actions and behaviors that are considered improperly influ-
ential.
6. Trading Restrictions68
Except as permitted by the SEC rules, no director or execu-
tive officer of an issuer may buy, sell, or otherwise acquire or
transfer any equity security of the issuer during the so-called
"blackout period" if such security was acquired in connection
with his or her service or employment as a director or executive
officer.69 Generally speaking, a "blackout period" is a period
during which participants in the issuer's 401 (k) plan,7 ° or other
64. See C.c. arts. 2392-95.
65. See Compilation of Conflicts, supra note 52.
66. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303.
67. See id. § 303(a). See also Final Rule: Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits,
SEC Release No. 34,47890, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-47890.htm
(last modified Sept. 26, 2003) (containing the final text of the rule).
68. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306.
69. See id. § 306(a)(1).
70. A 401 (k) is a type of retirement plan that allows employees to save and invest
for their retirement. Through a 401 (k), an employee can authorize his/her employer
to deduct a certain amount of money from his/her pay check before taxes are calcu-
lated, and to invest it in the 401 (k) plan. This money is invested in stock options that
are selected by the employee from the ones offered through his/her company's plan.
The federal government established the 401 (k) in 1981 with special tax advantages, to
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individual account plan that allows participants to invest in their
company's securities, are subject to specific restrictions on trans-
actions in issuer securities held for their account in such plans.71
Any profit earned by such prohibited trading may be recovered
by the issuer, irrespective of the intention of the director or ex-
ecutive officer to engage in such transaction.7 2 This remedy may
also be pursued by a single shareholder if the issuer, upon re-
quest of the shareholder, does not start an action to recover the
profits within sixty days of a request that it do so, or fails to dili-
gently pursue the action.73 The issuer is required to provide no-
tice of each pension fund blackout period to each of its directors
and executive officers as well as to the SEC.7 4
The area of insider trading during pension fund blackouts
seems to be adequately addressed by most European countries.
Their corporate governance rules in this area are quite similar in
content to Section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC is therefore
likely to recognize foreign companies' home state requirements.
The only exception is Germany, which limits its insider trading
sanctions to people residing in the United States.
7. Prohibition of Service as a Director or Officer 75
Sarbanes-Oxley provides that an individual can, at the re-
quest of the SEC, be enjoined from serving as an officer or direc-
tor of a public company if he or she is deemed "unfit" for violat-
ing the general anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.76 Al-
though the SEC already had this authority under existing laws,
the previous standard was "substantial unfitness" 77 rather than
encourage people to prepare for retirement. It gets its name from the section of the
Internal Revenue Code which established it.
71. See Collected Wisdom on Blackout Periods, available at http://www.401khelp
center.com/cw/cw blackout.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
72. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(a) (2) (A).
73. See id. § 306(a)(2)(B).
74. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(a) (6).
75. See id. § 305.
76. See id. § 305(a).
77. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2) (1934) (amended
2002); Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e) (1933) (amended 1954).
Both Acts were amended by striking the "substantial unfitness" standard and replacing
it with the "unfitness" standard. Id. See also The New Disclosure & Corporate Governance
Regime: What Every Corporate & Securities Lawryer Must Know Now - Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002, 1335 PLI/Coup 11, 49 (Oct. 8, 2002) (noting that Section 21 (d) (2) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (i.e., § 78u(d) (2)) is amended by striking "substantial unfit-
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the simpler standard of "unfitness." Under the previous stan-
dard, the SEC had some difficulty demonstrating to the courts
that the relevant conduct rendered someone "substantially unfit"
to hold those positions." The new "unfitness" standard, how-
ever, will likely make litigating officer and director injunctions
easier for the SEC.
The Act also allows the SEC to seek the bar order if, after
the notice and the hearing, it finds that the individual has
wilfully or without reasonable justification violated the general
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.79
B. Requirements and Restrictions for Audit Committees and
Audit Services
The Enron and Worldcom experiences, together with other
corporate scandals, made it clear that auditing firms operated in
a way that was anything but independent. Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley,
the laws allowed a considerable degree of overlap between audit
and non-audit services, giving rise to conflicts of interest and fa-
cilitating complicity in covering malfeasance. As will be illus-
trated in the paragraphs that follow, Sarbanes-Oxley's primary
goal is to enhance auditors' independence by imposing (i) re-
strictions on their compensatory fees and possible affiliations,
(ii) stricter expertise requirements and, most importantly (iii)
restrictions on the non-audit services that auditors may provide.
1. Audit Committee Provisions80
a. Auditors' Independence l
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduces provision
1OA(m) (3) which sets forth the independence requirements for
the members of the audit committee.8 2 In order to be "indepen-
dent," an audit committee must meet the "compensatory fees"
and "affiliation" standards.
ness" and inserting "unfitness" and that Section 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 (i.e.,
§ 77t(e)) is amended by striking "substantial unfitness" and inserting "unfitness").
78. See Louis Lavelle, Enron Directors: Unfit to Serve Anywhere? Bus. WiL ONLINE,
Feb. 12, 2002, available at http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/weekly-article/executive-
dodge-taxes.html.
79. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 107(d) (3) (A)-(C).
80. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301.
81. See id. §§ 201-09.
82. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 301(10) (m) (3).
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According to the compensatory fees standard, no member
of an audit committee can accept any consulting, advisory or
other compensatory fee from the issuer, other than in the mem-
ber's capacity as member of the audit committee, the board of
directors or any other board committee.8" Prohibited payments
include both those made directly or indirectly, such as to a
spouse or an entity in which the member is a partner. On the
other hand, compensatory fees do not include the receipt of
fixed amounts under a retirement plan.84
Under the affiliation standard, a member cannot be an "af-
filiated person" of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer, other
than in the member's capacity as a member of the audit commit-
tee or director.85 An "affiliated person" is a person who directly
or indirectly controls, or is controlled by, or is under common
control with, the issuer, a term originally defined in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.86
Section 301 makes the following exceptions to the indepen-
dence requirement. First, for newly reporting companies such
as those which are listing in connection with their initial public
offering, only one member of the audit committee will have to
be independent at the time of the listing; a majority of the mem-
bers will have to be independent within ninety days, and all
members will have to be independent within one year.8 7 Sec-
ondly, an audit committee member will be allowed to serve on
the board of directors of both the listed issuer and an affiliate of
the issuer so long as the member otherwise meets the indepen-
dence requirements for both entities.
In the first months of 2003, the EU began to express very
strong concerns about the above audit committee requirements.
"The criteria to determine the independence of audit commit-
tee members seem conceptually insufficient," remarked Alexan-
der Schaub, Internal Market Director General at the European
83. See id. § 301(3) (B) (i).
84. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, SEC Release No.
33-8220, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm (last modified Apr.
10, 2003).
85. See id. § 301 (3) (B) (ii).
86.' See SEC General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2004).
87. See Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, SEC Adopts Standards Relating to Listed
Company Audit Committees, Apr. 28, 2003, available at http://www.commlaw.com/CM/
Industry%20Groups/SEC%2OStandards.pdf.
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Commission.8 According to Mr. Schaub, the independence
standard must be defined practically, while specifically identify-
ing the relationships that pose a threat to the audit committee's
independence. For example, the definition of independence
does not cover the relationships that audit committee members
may have with the audit firm or its related entities. Nor does it
address family relationships of audit committee members with
the company's executive officers. "A more systematic principles-
based approach to the independence of audit committee mem-
bers would certainly provide better investor protection.""9
Schaub also points out that the appointment of indepen-
dent audit committee members should not be left to the entire
board of directors, including management, but rather should be
a task for the independent directors of the company alone. In
the EU context, such an approach is also recommended by the
report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts.90
Section 301 is one of the most criticized provisions of the
new law.9" As the European Commission pointed out, Section
301 suggests that every issuer should have an audit committee
"but does not make audit committees directly mandatory for reg-
istrants."9 2 If the registrant does not have an audit committee,
the independence requirements have to be fulfilled by all board
members." Undoubtedly, it is unclear how this solution would
or could work in the single and dual board systems of EU Mem-
ber States. In other words, the implementing rules will have to
take into account the different EU corporate governance systems
that exist in the various Member States. Moreover, these "differ-
ent legal backgrounds should be considered in defining disclo-
sure requirements for financial experts on audit committees. '
Numerous U.S.-EU roundtables were held to find an accord
on the issues raised by Section 301. The SEC's final rule, which
became effective on April 25, 2003,9' marks the beginning of a
88. Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58.
89. Id.
90. On the European reform of corporate governance, see infra. Part V. See also
Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58.
91. See Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, SEC Release No.
33-8220 (Apr. 25, 2003).
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healthy and constructive dialogue between the parties. Accord-
ing to the final rule, all foreign issuers listed in the United States
are exempted from the obligation to have an audit committee,
provided that: (i) the foreign issuer has an alternative structure
such as a board of auditors pursuant to its own national laws;9 6
(ii) the same board of auditors is separate and distinct from the
board of directors; (iii) no executive director of the company is a
member of the board of auditors; (iv) the board of auditors is
not appointed by the board of directors; (v) the foreign issuer's
national laws provide standards that assure the independence of
the board of auditors from management; and (vi) the foreign
issuer's national laws or its by-laws provide that the board of au-
ditors is responsible for appointing and monitoring the activities
of the outside auditor, as well as solving all conflicts which may
arise between the outside auditor and the board of directors.
97
b. Auditors' Expertise9"
The issuer's audit committee must include at least one "fi-
nancial expert," meaning a person who through experience as a
public accountant or auditor or as the principal financial officer,
comptroller or principal accounting officer of a company has ac-
quired: (i) a thorough understanding of the generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP") and financial statements; (ii)
expertise in preparing or auditing financial statements of com-
panies comparable to the issuer; (iii) expertise with internal ac-
counting controls; and (iv) an understanding of the functioning
of audit committees.99
This definition of "financial expert" has caused controversy
in Europe. In fact, although it is natural and completely under-
standable that the SEC is interested in requiring financial ex-
perts to have a deep understanding of the U.S. environment, the
definition limits the choice for EU companies automatically ex-
96. The Italian collegio sindacale was cited in the SEC's final rule as an example of a
board of auditors that satisfies Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements. In fact, although the
collegio sindacale is not directly responsible for the outside auditor's activity, it still
monitors the company internally. See D.LGS. 58/1998, art. 149(1) (c) (listing monitoring
the company's internal controls among the duties of the collegio).
97. See Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58. See also Studio Santa
Maria, I1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act del 2002 e i suoi riflessi sulle SocietA Europee, available at
http://www.santalex.com/news.htm (July 2, 2003).
98. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407.
99. See id. § 407(b)1-4.
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cluding all those experts who, though being highly qualified
from a "local" point of view, lack direct U.S. experience."°0
c. Auditors' Responsibilities and Functions
In general, audit committees are responsible for the ap-
pointment, compensation, retention, and oversight of the work
of the issuer's independent auditor who is required to report
directly to the audit committee.' 1 The core functions of audit
committees are to: (i) pre-approve the provision by the inde-
pendent auditor of all audit and non-audit services;102 (ii) ana-
lyze all reports by the auditor with respect to the issuer's ac-
counting policies and practices; 10 3 (iii) resolve any possible dis-
agreements between the auditor and management concerning
the issuer's financial reporting;' °4 (iv) be involved in analyzing
internal control deficiencies and management or employee
fraud, as identified in the CEO/CFO certifications; 0 5 (v) estab-
lish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of com-
plaints addressed to the issuer regarding accounting, internal
control procedures, or auditing matters; and (vi) for the confi-
dential, anonymous submission by the employees of concerns re-
garding questionable accounting or auditing matters. 1 6
It is problematic that in most European countries, the
shareholders, and not the audit committees, appoint the outside
auditors.'0 7 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement that the
audit committee be composed only of independent directors is
totally incompatible with laws in Germany and in the Nether-
lands that mandate employee representation on boards.
100. See Letter from Alexander Schaub, Director General of the European Com-
mission, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC, (Nov. 29, 2002) available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/aschaubl.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
101. See Charles Hecht, SEC Central: Audit Committee and Management Disclo-
sure Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, available at http://www.smartpros.com/
x35187.xml (2002).
102. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202(i) (A).
103. See id. § 204(k) (1).
104. See id. § 301(m)(2).
105. See id. § 302(a)(5)(A).
106. See id. § 301(m).
107. See Louis Lavelle & Mike McNamee, Will Foreign Boards Play by US Rules?, Bus.
WK. ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
dec2002/nf2002126_4116.htm.
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d. Adequate Funding
In order to enable the audit committee to carry out its func-
tions in the most accurate and complete way possible, the Act
requires issuers to authorize their audit committees to enlist in-
dependent counsel and any other advisers the audit committee
determines necessary to carry out its duties.' Issuers are also
required to provide appropriate funding to compensate the in-
dependent auditor and its advisors. 10 9
Although the above-described rules apply to all SEC-report-
ing companies (both U.S. and non-U.S.), the final text of the Act
has come to include a series of accommodations and amend-
ments originally proposed to address specific concerns raised by
non-U.S. issuers. Such exemptions for non-U.S. issuers allow:
(i) non-management employees of a non-U.S. issuer to
serve as audit committee members; 110
(ii) a representative of a non-U.S. government shareholder
to serve on the audit committee; 1
(iii) a more than 50% shareholder of a non-U.S. issuer or a
representative of such a shareholder to serve on the au-
dit committee, if the member has only an observer status
and is not a voting member of the audit committee; 2
(iv) alternative structures, such as boards of auditors or statu-
tory auditors, to perform auditor oversight functions
where those structures are provided for under local
law; 113
(v) the election, approval or ratification of the selection of
the outside auditor by a non-U.S. issuer's sharehold-
ers.
1 1 4
The European State that appears closest to the new U.S. au-
dit committee requirements is, of course, England. England's
Combined Code recommends all companies to have an audit
committee and requires that it be composed of a majority of in-
108. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m) (5).
109. See id. § 301(m)(6).
110. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, U.S. Regula-
tors Propose Audit Exemptions for Non-U.S. Firms, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/econ/mlc/03011002.htm (Jan. 10, 2003).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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dependent members." 5 That said, a "recommendation" is very
different from an "obligation".
All U.S. issuers will have to comply with the new listing re-
quirements by the date of their first annual shareholders meet-
ing after January 15, 2004, and in no event later than October
31, 2004 whilst non-U.S. issuers will be required to comply by
July 31, 2005.
2. Regulation of Audit Services' 1 6
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes restrictions on an issuer's relation-
ship with its auditor. More significantly, the Act prohibits ac-
counting firms from providing any audit service to an issuer if
the CEO, controller, CFO, or chief accounting officer of the is-
suer was employed by that accounting firm and participated in
any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the one-year pe-
riod preceding the date of the initiation of the audit."7
a. Restrictions on Non-Audit Services
The Act significantly restricts the non-audit services that au-
dit firms may offer to issuers."' In general, an accounting firm
that provides auditing services for an issuer cannot also provide
non-audit services to that same issuer. That said, the Act takes a
measured approach to the non-audit services issue. Not all non-
audit services are in fact equal and, despite widespread misun-
derstanding, the SEC never intended to prohibit them gener-
ally.' 19
Section 201 makes it unlawful for the auditor to provide the
following nine non-audit services: (i) book-keeping or other ser-
vices related to the accounting records or financial statements of
the audit client; (ii) financial information systems design and im-
plementation; (iii) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opin-
ions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (iv) actuarial services; (v)
115. See National Association of Corporate Directors ("NACD"), Concerning Reforms
in the Aftermath of the Enron Bankruptcy, Recommendations from the NACD, available at
http://www.nacdonline.org/nacd/enron-recommendations.asp (May 3, 2002).
116. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 206.
117. Id.
118. Seeid. § 201(a).
119. See Thomas L. Riesenberg, The Non-Audit Service Restrictions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, available at http://www.aicpa.
org/info/bna_020924.htm (Sept. 24, 2002).
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internal audit outsourcing services; (vi) management functions
or human resources; (vii) broker or dealer, investment adviser,
or investment banking services; (viii) legal services and expert
services unrelated to the audit; and (ix) any other service that
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board defines, by
regulation, as impermissible. 12° Tax services, which belong to
the category of non-audit services, may only be provided to the
issuer if approved in advance by the issuer's audit committee.1 21
Most European countries see the difficult balance between
auditing and non-audit services as an area in need of detailed
consideration. In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley, by strictly prohibiting au-
ditors from offering the above-mentioned non-audit services, is
in contrast with the more flexible European approach that
grants the relevant audit committees the authority to decide, on
a case by case basis, whether or not a particular work can be
done by an auditing firm without compromising its indepen-
dence. 12 2
b. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board123
To address the perceived deficiencies in the regulation of
the accounting profession, the Act creates a Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (the "PCAOB") which is subject to the
SEC's oversight authority. 124 Accounting firms, including non-
U.S. firms, that prepare audit reports for issuers will be required
to register with, and submit annual reports to, the PCAOB. By
registering, accounting firms consent to comply with any request
of the PCAOB or the SEC for testimony or production of docu-
ments.125 The PCAOB's functions include: (i) establishing rules
governing auditing, ethics, independence and other standards
relating to the preparation of audit reports; (ii) conducting in-
spections on registered public accounting firms; and (iii) con-
ducting investigations as well as disciplinary proceedings against
120. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201.
121. Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 201, any such approvals by the audit
committee must be publicly disclosed in the issuer's periodic reports as required also
under the Exchange Act.
122. See Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Standards Relating To Listed Company
Audit Committees, SEC Release Nos. 33-8173; 34-47137; IC-25885 available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/ericssonl.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
123. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, tit. I.
124. See id. § 101(a).
125. See id. § 102(b)(2)(C).
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registered public accounting firms and persons associated with
such firms.
126
Most European countries greeted the institution of the
PCAOB with strong hostility. 127 EU Commissioner Frits Bolkes-
tein wrote to SEC chairman William Donaldson arguing that the
"registration of EU audit firms [with the PCAOB] is unnecessary,
burdensome and disproportionate because the EU has already
equivalent systems in place that deal with registration, oversight
and external quality assurance of auditors which are continu-
ously being improved at EU and national level."'1 28 Moreover,
the PCAOB's access to internal audit documents constitutes a
breach of the professional secrecy laws existing in most Euro-
pean countries and, as such, raises concerns about confidential-
ity obligations.12 9 In the conclusion of his letter, Commissioner
Bolkestein demanded that European audit firms working for
U.S.-listed companies be exempted from registering with the
PCAOB. Bolkestein warned that "it would be difficult to avoid
[a] call for reciprocity ... whereby the U.S. [firms] would have
to register with all our [M]ember [S]tates," he also added that
"this could mean undergoing the process up to 25 times."130
Following Frits Bolkestein's letter to the SEC, the Finance
Ministers of the European Union issued a declaration on June 3,
2003, opposed to the mandatory registration of European audit
126. See generally Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, at http://www.
pcaobus.org (2003).
127. See Alexander Schaub, Integrated European Financial Markets: The Stakes for U.S.
Business, European Union in the U.S.: Speeches, available at http://www.eurunion.
org/news/speeches/2003/030703as.htm (July 3, 2003).
128. Commissioner Frits Bolkestein continues: "The European Commission fully
shares the goal of having effective audit systems in place in order to prevent accounting
irregularities and restore investor confidence in the securities market. However, this
should be done on the basis of internationally acceptable solutions, including mutual
recognition of equivalent systems of oversight." News Releases, EU Concerned About US
Audit Registration Step, European Union in the U.S., No. 27/3, Apr. 24, 2003, available at
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2003/2003027.htm.
129. In fact, the mandatory registration of European audit firms to the PCAOB
would determine that (i) the personal data of tens of thousands of people working for
the audit firms would be transferred to the United States; and (ii) the European audit
firms would have to grant access to all audit confidential working papers as well as to
any other audit client document. See Gumbel, supra note 36.
130. See Paul Grant, EU Warns off SEC, at http://www.AccountancyAge.com/News/
1133274 (Apr. 23, 2003). See also EU threatens reciprocal controls on US Firms, available at
http://www.AccountancyAge.com/News/1133211 (April 15, 2003).
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firms with the PCAOB.13  They requested the negotiation of a
transatlantic mutual recognition agreement based on home
country control. Subsequently, in October 2003, Commissioner
Bolkestein introduced the idea of a particular form of registra-
tion for non-U.S. auditing firms: "Registration is something that
can be done in different ways. We are trying to define what pre-
cisely registration means and how it should be done." 132 Bolkes-
tein added that inspections and investigations would have to be
carried out by EU officials in coordination with the PCAOB,
rather than directly by U.S. officials. The reason is practical.
The PCAOB admits that it does not have sufficient resources to
conduct a detailed screening of audit firms in twenty-five Mem-
ber States with twenty-one different languages. Thus, the
PCAOB will need to cooperate with each and every State of the
European Union if it wishes to carry out inspections or investiga-
tions. 13
After countless comment letters, public roundtables, and bi-
lateral and multilateral meetings, the SEC decided not to ex-
empt foreign accounting firms from registration with the
PCAOB. It did make, however, a series of significant preliminary
accommodations for foreign firms: (i) foreign firms are not re-
quired to provide registration information to the PCAOB, where
the provision of such information would violate home country
laws; (ii) foreign audit firms are granted an additional six
months to register with the PCAOB, in consideration of the fact
that they will have to assess whether the new registration require-
ments pose a conflict with their local law; (iii) registration will be
required only with respect to proprietors, partners and princi-
pals of foreign audit firms who provide over ten hours of service
on a particular audit.1 3 4
131. See Alan Osborn, EU Urges U.S. to Reconsider Rules, available at http://www.
accountancyage.com/News/ 1133834 (June 12, 2003). See also Burson-Marsteller,
Sarbanes-Oxley: One Year Later - The Jury is Still Out, Summer 2003, Points of View,
available at http://www.bm.com/newsroom/pov.html.
132. LisaJucca, Bolkestein Sees EU-US. Audit Firm Deal by Year End, Forbes.com, avail-
able at http: / /www.forbes.com/personalfinance/ retirement/ newswire/ 2003/10/09/ rtr
1103943.html (Oct. 9, 2003).
133. See id.
134. Ethiopis Tafara, Speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Lux-
embourg (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch061003
et.htm (addressing international concerns under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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C. Expanded Company Disclosures
The most salient characteristic of Sarbanes-Oxley is that it
imposes much stricter disclosure requirements on virtually all ac-
tivities of the issuing company. The following are the most sig-
nificant new disclosure requirements set forth in the Act.
1. Accuracy of Financial Reports" 5
Each financial report filed by the issuer with the SEC must
reflect all "material correcting adjustments" identified by the is-
suer's independent auditor in accordance with the GAAP and
the SEC rules."3 6 The SEC adopted the final rules regulating the
use of non-GAAP financial measures in public disclosures. 3 7
The new rules, which implement Sections 401 and 409 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, became effective on March 28, 2003.138 The
SEC amended the existing disclosure regulations and created
stricter rules to information contained in a press release or simi-
lar public disclosure. 139
Public companies, including foreign private issuers, that dis-
close or release non-GAAP financial measures are now required
to include in such disclosures a presentation of the most directly
comparable GAAP financial measure and a reconciliation of the
two measures. 4 ° Furthermore, in the case of non-GAAP finan-
cial measures included in an SEC filing, a registrant must also
state: (i) why it believes the non-GAAP financial measure would
be useful to investors, and (ii) to the extent material, the addi-
tional purposes for which management uses the non-GAAP fi-
nancial measure that are not otherwise disclosed."'
2. Real-Time Disclosure of Certain Information 4
2
Issuers are required to disclose "on a rapid and current ba-
135. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401.
136. See id. § 401(a)(i).
137. See Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, SEC
Release No. 33-8176 (Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8176.htm [hereinafter Release No. 33-8176].
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP, Legal Alert: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Compliance Update, News & Events, Apr. 2003, available at http://www.sablaw.com/
news/alerts.asp.
141. See Release No. 33-8176, supra note 137.
142. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409.
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sis" all "information concerning material changes in [their] fi-
nancial condition or operations" as the SEC may by rule require
as "necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the
public interest." '43 This disclosure must be "in plain English."'44
3. Restrictions on Use of Pro Forma Financial Information 145
Companies may only present pro forma financial informa-
tion, meaning statements that are not prepared in accordance
with GAAP, in a manner that "does not contain an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state a material fact" that
would render the information misleading. 46 Such new rules ap-
ply to all pro forma information, regardless of whether the infor-
mation is contained in an SEC filing or in any press release or
other public disclosure.
4. Off-Balance-Sheet Transactions1 47
In every annual report filed with the SEC, the issuer is re-
quired to disclose "all material off-balance-sheet transactions, ar-
rangements, obligations and other relationships with unconsoli-
dated entities." Likewise, the statement must identify persons
"that may have a material current or future effect" on the issuer's
"financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital ex-
penditures, capital resources, or significant components of reve-
nues or expenses. '
5. Auditor Attestation 149
The issuer's independent auditor is required to report on
management's assessment of the issuer's internal control struc-
ture and procedures. Such report must be made in accordance
with the standards adopted by the Oversight Board. °
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. § 401.
146. See id. § 401(b)(1).
147. See id. at § 401. See Final Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and
Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obliga-
tions, SEC Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8182.htm.
148. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401 (a). This rule is effective for fiscal years ending
on or after June 15, 2003.
149. See id. § 404.
150. See id. § 404(b).
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6. Management and Independent Auditor Assessment of
Internal Controls 151
Every issuer's annual report must contain an "internal con-
trol report" stating that management is responsible for establish-
ing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting. Said report must also assess,
as of the end of the last fiscal year, the effectiveness of the inter-
nal control structure and procedures for financial reporting.'52
"Currently, EU Member States do not require a specific cer-
tification of internal controls system by management and attesta-
tion by auditors." 5 ' Thus, European companies face significant
additional burdens under the new U.S. requirements (e.g., hir-
ing of new personnel, bureaucratic reporting systems, etc.).
"The new concept of certification of internal control systems by
executive management as well as by auditors has already been
extensively considered in a number of Member States... but has
not been adopted as a legal requirement."1 54 The European
Union generally supports internal control reporting as an effec-
tive means of improving the quality of financial reporting.'55
Nevertheless, the practical workability of the U.S. approach and
whether its cost/benefit balance will be justifiable depends ulti-
mately on the implementing rules that are adopted.' 56 The Eu-
ropean Union's position in this respect is that the SEC should
grant European firms a full exemption from the attestation of
the internal controls system.157
D. Responsibilities of Counsel
On January 23, 2003, the SEC adopted final rules imple-
menting Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions prescribing "minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representa-
tion of issuers. "158 Attorneys representing issuers before the SEC
151. See id. § 404.
152. See id. § 404(a)(2).
153. See id.
154. See Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307. See also Final Rule: Implementation of Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC Release No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003),
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will be required to report violations of securities laws, breaches
of fiduciary duty or other similar violations by the issuer to the
issuer's chief legal officer and CEO. 159 If an appropriate re-
sponse fails to be taken, the attorneys must report the evidence
to the issuer's audit committee or to the board of directors.16 °
The European community expressed strong concern that it
would be inequitable to apply these rules to foreign attorneys,
who are bound by conflicting home country ethics requirements
(such as the attorney-client privilege) or who lack the expertise
necessary to assess violations of U.S. law. 161 Some commentators
have argued that such rules constitute breaches of the attorney-
client privilege.1 62 These rules, ultimately, exclude most foreign
attorneys, as the regulation only applies to those licensed to
practice law in the United States. How a multi-jurisdictional
practitioner fairs under these laws must be tested or resolved.
IV. PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes criminal penalties for specific cate-
gories of misconduct, some of which were not subject to criminal
penalties before its passage. Particularly significant are the crim-
inal penalties introduced by Sarbanes-Oxley that punish false
certifications, fraud, and the destruction and/or alteration of
corporate records.
A. CEO/CFO False Certification"63
The Act requires the issuer to accompany their annual re-
port with a written statement by the CEO or CFO containing the
§ 906 certification discussed above. 6 4 A CEO or CFO who pro-
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm [hereinafter Release No. 33-
81851.
159. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(1). This obligation is referred to as "up-the-
ladder reporting." See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, SEC "Up the Ladder"
Reporting Requirement: Practical Suggestions for in House-Attorneys, Firm Publications, avail-
able at http://www.ffhsj.com/firmpubs.htm (July 18, 2003).
160. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(2).
161. See Release No. 33-8176, supra note 158 (discussing scope and purpose of
Section 205.1).
162. See Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, SEC Release No. 33-8186, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
33-8186.htm#1167-42382 (last modified Sept. 26, 2003).
163. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906.
164. See supra Part III.A.1.
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vides such a certification with knowledge that the report does
not comply with all of the described requirements is subject to a
USD 1 million fine and/or imprisonment, for a maximum term
of ten years. If the false certification was done "wilfully," the
penalty is increased to a USD 5 million fine and/or imprison-
ment for a maximum term of twenty years. 16
5
B. Audit Records Destruction or Alteration'66
The Act requires auditors to maintain and preserve audit
work-papers and other documents connected to an audit of an
issuer for a period of five years.' 67 The knowing and wilful alter-
ation or destruction of any of these work-papers may result in a
fine and/or imprisonment of up to ten years. 6 ' If done with the
intent to impede, obstruct or influence a governmental investi-
gation, the administration of any governmental function or a
bankruptcy proceeding, the penalty is increased to a fine and/or
imprisonment up to twenty years.
C. Securities Fraud169
The Act makes it illegal for any person to knowingly execute
or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud any person in con-
neetion with any security of a public company. It also prohibits
the procurement, by means of false or fraudulent representa-
tions or promises, of any money or property in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security of a public company. The
penalty for violation of this provision of law is a fine and/or im-
prisonment of up to twenty-five years.
D. Increased Penalties
The Act establishes new monetary sanctions and criminal
penalties for securities fraud involving accounting irregularities
and financial fraud. Some sanctions are specifically applicable
to directors, officers, and professionals that have committed,
conspired with, or "aided and abetted" the commission of viola-
165. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.§ 803.
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tions."7 For those found guilty of committing securities fraud
and financially responsible for their actions, those debts will not
be dischargeable in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding filed
by the responsible party."' The Act also extends the applicable
statute of limitations for securities fraud (i) from the existing
one-year period to a term of two years after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation or (ii) five years, as opposed to
the existing three-year period, after such violation.
E. "Whistleblower" Protection172
To protect persons who report suspect practices, Sarbanes-
Oxley prohibits the discharge or discrimination against employ-
ees who lawfully report violations to authorities. These authori-
ties include governmental agents or persons with supervisory
power over the employee or those who are authorized by the
issuer to investigate suspect conduct (e.g., the audit committee
and auditors). Sarbanes-Oxley's protection applies only when
the "whistleblower" reasonably believes that the conduct in ques-
tion constitutes a violation of the securities laws or financial
fraud statutes. The Act amends the U.S. federal criminal law to
prohibit issuers and their employees (including contractors, sub-
contractors or other agents) from discriminating in the terms
and conditions of employment against employees that provide
information or cooperation with investigations carried out by
U.S. federal regulatory or law investigating authorities.173 A
wronged damaged employee can seek relief under the provi-
sions of the Act by filing a timely claim with the Department of
Labor.174
As a further guarantee, the Act provides that if the Secretary
of Labour does not render a decision within 180 days, the plain-
tiff may bring an action for de novo review before the U.S. fed-
eral district court with jurisdiction. 75 Once in federal court, po-
tential relief can include not only reinstatement but also back-
pay with interest and compensation for special damages such as
170. See id. § 703.
171. See id.
172. See id.§ 806.
173. See id.§ 806(a).
174. See id.§ 806.
175. See id.§ 806,
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attorney's fees and other litigation costs. 1 76
V. THE EUROPEAN REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Common Markets with Uncommon Practices
Domestic laws often have international consequences. A
growing and mutually beneficial economic integration that also
creates confusion and controversy for businesses on both sides of
the Atlantic. The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley by the U.S. Con-
gress is only the most recent example of this phenomenon.
Overnight, public companies with securities traded in the
United States, as well as their officers, faced a wide range of new
legal and regulatory requirements. With very few exceptions,
Sarbanes-Oxley does differentiate between U.S. and non-U.S.
companies in its application.177 Considering that there are 469
non-U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on companies based in the European
Union has been considerable.
That said, U.S. laws are not unique in their impact on the
international community. In the area of corporate governance,
for instance, the European Union has advanced its own package
of corporate reform initiatives that may have a far-reaching im-
pact on European and U.S. companies alike.178 Although these
initiatives are at various stages of adoption and implementation,
they all have the potential to create significant new regulatory
obligations for both EU and non-EU companies.
The transformation of the more than forty existing corpo-
rate governance codes has long been a European political prior-
ity. One of the salient economic problems faced in this project,
176. See id. § 1314A(c) (2) (B), (C).
177. All foreign private issuers are subject to the new legislation. Pursuant to Rule
3b-4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 1999, a "foreign private
issuer" is an entity - other than a foreign government - incorporated or organized
under the laws of a country other than the United States, except an issuer meeting the
following conditions: (i) more than 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly held by residents of the United States; and (ii) any of the follow-
ing: (a) the majority of the executive officers and directors are U.S. citizens or re-
sidents; (b) more than 50% of the assets of the issuer are located in the United States;
or (c) the business of the issuer is administered principally in the United States.
178. Important initiatives under the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan include
the International Accounting Standards Regulation, the Prospectus Directive, the
Transparency Obligations Directive, the Investment Services Directive and the Market
Abuse Directive.
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however, is the lack of a unified economy and established private
voice for the region.179 In spite of the single market of the Euro-
pean Union, Member States continue to differ greatly in their
philosophical views of corporate entities and their relationships
to shareholders.' The role of employees in corporate govern-
ance, the primacy of shareholder interests, the rights of minority
shareholders, board structures, as well as the relationship be-
tween management and the supervisory body differ greatly
across the continent. These differences cause the European
Union considerable difficulty when promulgating common stan-
dards for corporate transactions and behavior.
B. The Report of the High Level Group of Company Experts
Despite the impasse, the European Union is just as deter-
mined as the United States to increase investor protection and
prevent corporate scandals. This was the stated goal even before
EU finance ministers called for urgent action in the wake of the
American corporate and accounting scandals. After these mar-
ket-shaking events, the focus on strong corporate governance
only intensified. In November 2002, the European Commission
received the report from the Group of Company Law Experts
(hereinafter the "Group") who had been charged in September
2001 with making recommendations for a more effective regula-
tory framework for corporate law (hereinafter the "Report").181
The Group's mandate was expanded, in reaction to Enron, to
cover corporate governance and auditing issues, including the
roles of non-executive and supervisory directors, the remunera-
tion of management, the responsibility of management for fi-
nancial statements, and auditing practices.18 2
179. See HollyJ. Gregory, The Globalisation of Corporate Governance, Weil, Gotshall, &
Manges LLP, (Sept.-Oct. 2000) available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/
globalisation-of-corporate-governance.pdf.
180. See Company Law: Commission creates High Level Group of Experts, Financial Re-
porting & Company Law, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/
en/company/company/news/01-1237.htm (Apr. 11, 2001).
181. See A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: A Consultative
Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Financial Reporting & Company
Law (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/com-
pany/company/modem/consult/ 1en.htm.
182. See Financial Services: Commission services publish analysis of repercussions
of Enron collapse, available at www.lex.unict.it/cde/documenti/econ-finanza/2002/
020418enron-en.htm (Apr. 18, 2002).
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The Group also focused on various areas including disclo-
sure, shareholder rights and minority protection, duties of the
board, auditing practices, and concluded affirming the need for
an EU-wide corporate governance code. The Report's key pro-
posals included, but were not limited to, changes in corporate
governance.
18 3
Although the recommendations of the Group modify the
principles of corporate governance in several European coun-
tries, its proposals did not yet result in a binding EU-wide set of
rules along the lines of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
1. Annual Corporate Governance Statement
The Group recommended that the principles for the state-
ment be set out in a "framework directive, leaving the detailed
rules to be established by the [M]ember [S]tates."' 4 A number
of key issues that the annual corporate governance statement
should address include the identification of the national code of
corporate governance and/or company law rules with which it
complies.
2. Shareholder Information and Communication
There should be greater shareholder involvement in com-
pany general meetings. For instance, listed companies should
disclose to their shareholders the mechanics of asking questions,
interpreting the company's answer and submitting proposals to
the general meeting. Additionally, listed companies should facil-
itate shareholder voting by electronic means and through hard
copy instructions or proxy forms.18 5
3. Institutional Investors
Institutional investors in all Member States should be re-
quired to disclose their policies on investment and on the exer-
cise of voting rights in the companies in which they invest.18 6
183. See Corporate Finance Law Bulletin (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.
sjberwin.com/media/pdf/publications/corpfinbulletin/1202.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
184. See id. at 3.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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4. Board Structures
Listed companies should (i) have the choice between one
and two-tier boards 187 so as to adopt the system which best suits
their corporate governance needs, and (ii) be required to en-
sure through their corporate governance procedures that the
appointment and remuneration of directors as well as the super-
vision of the company's audit be decided upon only by non-exec-
utive or supervisory directors.
5. Wrongful Trading
A framework rule on wrongful trading should be imple-
mented in Europe so as to hold company directors (including
shadow directors)188 liable, allowing the company to do business
if and to the extent it cannot pay its debts.
6. Special Investigations
Give the shareholders the right, either in a general meeting
or holding a minimum of 5% of the company's share capital, to
apply to a court or other administrative body to order a special
investigation. Such an order, however, should be conceived as
an extreme measure and be granted only in the presence of seri-
ous suspicion of improper behavior. The Report further advises
the European Union to coordinate the efforts of Member States
to facilitate convergence with respect to enforcement, taking
into account the developments in the United States.
VI. INTERNATIONAL TREND AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has very important effects on U.S.-
listed EU companies and auditors. European authorities have
been given the opportunity to comment on each of Sarbanes
Oxley's provisions as part of a constructive regulatory dialogue
between the United States and the European Union.1 89
Sarbanes-Oxley, however, remains a U.S. reaction to U.S. finan-
cial reporting scandals. The European Commission and its fif-
187. Scholars refer to the continental European two-tier board as a structure that
clearly separates executive directors from non-executive directors. The strength of the
two-tier board is its supposed independence.
188. Shadow directors are persons in accordance with whose instructions the di-
rectors are accustomed to act.
189. See Letter from Schaub to Katz, 11/29/03, supra note 58.
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teen Member States share the same concerns as the United
States with respect to the integrity of the markets and would in
principle support many measures of the Act. The new rules,
however, if applicable to foreign companies, must take into ac-
count the specific legal corporate governance environments of
other parts of the world, including the European Union.
The impression of many in Europe is that the rules pro-
posed by the SEC have been tailored to fit and accommodate
only U.S. companies and U.S. auditors. 9 ° As such, they are
largely unacceptable to European companies, who are now con-
sidering whether to leave the U.S. markets. The European
Union and the United States most converge on common princi-
ples and understandings, which does not mean that they will
have to adopt an identical approach. It would be sufficient that
they agree to make their different approaches mutually consis-
tent and effective in achieving the same goals. The converging
of International Accounting Standards and U.S. GAAP is an ex-
cellent example of this approach.
At the core of U.S.-EU relations, whether they focus on au-
diting practices, disclosure standards, market stability or finan-
cial conglomerates, is a single concept: regulatory equiva-
lence.191 The success of all future relations will depend on
whether they recognize each other's standards as equivalent. Far
too often, the differences between countries' national laws and
regulatory systems are used to deny equivalence. The competent
authorities should take the time and make the effort to see
whether, despite taking a different approach, the same level of
investor protection could be achieved. The goal is not to ask
190. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley and all that: Impact beyond
America's Shores, Address before the FESE convention in London Uune 12, 2003),
available at http://www.fese.be/efmc/2003/report/efmc-cunningham.htm. Cunning-
ham states:
In the rush to do something, Congress neglected to recognize that it was for
the first time both (a) regulating amid globalisation and (b) injecting itself
into internal governance matters previously articulated by bodies other than
Congress or the SEC - both inside and outside the U.S.... The greatest risk
of exuberant exporting of U.S. corporate norms . . . is backlash against this
process.
Id.
191. See id. "The U.S. instantly benefits from the expression of comity it extends.
The U.S. may be the host of the party and can certainly invite who it wishes and lay
down the etiquette. But part of being a good host is recognizing the right guest list and
treating guests with respect." Id.
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one side to accept lower standards, nor is it to set unreasonable
requirements that do not protect investors, but rather to prevent
them from accessing real opportunities. While conflicts of laws
are inevitable given the variety of attitudes toward financial regu-
lation and oversight that exist around the world, the financial
markets dialogue has in the past been a successful forum for
openly airing concerns on both sides. After all, Europe and the
United States share the same objectives: sound financial market
supervision and efficient capital markets that generate real bene-
fits to firms and investors on both sides of the Atlantic.
WE HAVE TO SEIZE THIS CHANCE!
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission presented an
action plan for "Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Cor-
porate Governance in the EU" (the "Action Plan"),1 9 2 a major
part of the European response to Sarbanes-Oxley. The Action
Plan is a comprehensive set of legislative and non-legislative pro-
posals extending over three phases through 2009. The declared
goal of the Action Plan is to improve the level of coordination
between Member State initiatives (avoiding the adoption of a
comprehensive EU corporate governance code) .193 It follows the
Winter Group's recommendations to establish a broad frame-
work at the EU level, that allows a certain degree of Member
State flexibility.
Will Europe use Sarbanes-Oxley as a model? Although the
new U.S. rules of corporate governance can certainly serve as a
useful point of reference, it would be a mistake to follow them
blindly. In fact, for many years, given the weight of the U.S. capi-
tal markets, the U.S. regulatory regime was considered a model
for other countries. Yet, by the summer of 2002 it was clear that
192. See Latham & Watkins, The European Commission Publishes its Action Plan
on Modernizing European Company Law & Enhancing Corporate Governance in Re-
sponse to Enron, Ahold, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, available at http://www.lw.com/
resource/Publications/_pdf/pub747.pdf (May 28, 2003).
193. See id. The main emphasis of the Action Plan is on corporate governance
issues. For example, the Action Plan (i) introduces an "annual corporate governance
statement" requiring all listed companies to explain their corporate governance struc-
ture (e.g., shareholder rights and how they may be exercised, mechanisms of operation
of the boards, material transactions with related parties etc); (ii) facilitates the exercise
of shareholder rights; (iii) reinforces the collective responsibility of board members for
financial statements; (iv) recommends disclosure of the corporation's remuneration
policy.
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the U.S. regulatory scheme and its rules-based approach to ac-
counting and corporate disclosure, was not invincible. Enron's
sixty-four-page code of ethics, for example, did not prevent viola-
tions. Experience teaches us that the value of most corporate
governance regulation lies in the deterrent effect of stringent
enforcement. In other words, "there is nothing like jailing a few
corporate leaders to get everyone's attention. Punishments must
be more severe to act as meaningful deterrents to corporate
criminals." '194
Overall, the spate of new legislation and regulation on both
sides of the Atlantic highlights the need for U.S. and European
business communities to work together. Cooperation appears to
be no longer a matter of courtesy among businesses and institu-
tions but rather an obligation. As the European Commissioner
for Internal Market and Taxation Frits Bolkestein said, "we are at
a pivotal moment when legislation and rules on both sides of the
Atlantic are being reconsidered: an ideal opportunity to con-
verge, cooperate and compare. We have to seize this chance."195
194. Markus U. Diethelm, Corporate Governance on Command, CHIEF LEGAL EXECU-
TIVE, Winter 2003, at 60, 63, available at http://www.chieflegalexecutive.com/sub_
pages/publications/CLE/PDF/2003_winter/CLEWinforeignFinal.pdf.
195. Frits Bolkestein, EU-US Regulatory Cooperation on Financial Markets: A
Matter of Necessity?, Address before the European American Business Council in Wash-
ington D.C. (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/
2003/030224fb.htm (emphasis added).
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